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The Believer’s First Amendment 
Separating Church and State: Roger Williams  
and Religious Liberty 
by Timothy L. Hall*  
University of Illinois Press (1998) 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court’s Religion Clause jurisprudence has 
never satisfied most Americans. The Court has often appeared 
too secular and too skeptical to win over the populace at large.1 
Too frequently, the Court seems to have interpreted the First 
Amendment as if it were the result of cynicism and religious 
hostility. In reality, the First Amendment was the product of 
fervent religious enthusiasm.2 
In Separating Church and State: Roger Williams and Reli-
gious Liberty, Timothy Hall gives voice to one of those “relent-
lessly intolerant” and enthusiastic “religious fanatic[s]”3 re-
sponsible for the American tradition of religious liberty: Roger 
 
  * Associate Professor of Law, University of Mississippi Law School. 
 1.  See, e.g., County of Allegheny v. ACLU, 492 U.S. 573, 655 (1989) (Kennedy, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (accusing the majority’s “view of the Es-
tablishment Clause” of “an unjustified hostility toward religion, a hostility inconsistent 
with our history and our precedents”); Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 85 (1985) (Bur-
ger, C.J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority opinion “manifests not neutrality but 
hostility toward religion”); George W. Dent, Jr., Secularism and the Supreme Court, 
1999 BYU L. REV. 1, 21 & n.80, 55, 58 (arguing that because “most Americans remain 
[] religious” and because the Supreme Court unjustifiably “believe[s] religious people 
are irrational, . . . need[ing] to be enlightened with secular truth,” “[t]he Supreme 
Court should replace its secularist hostility to religion with a respect consistent with 
current social circumstances and understanding”). 
 2. See TIMOTHY L. HALL, SEPARATING CHURCH AND STATE: ROGER WILLIAMS 
AND RELIGIOUS LIBERTY 2-3 (1998) (agreeing “emphatically” with the thesis of Mark 
DeWolfe Howe and Robert Cover that “the First Amendment was the product of reli-
gious enthusiasm more than anything else, and that enthusiasm has sometimes been 
muffled in attempts to construe the religion clauses”). 
 3. Id. at 18, 27. 
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Williams. Hall argues that because Rhode Island founder 
Roger Williams stands at the beginning of America’s historical 
struggle with religious liberty, “one cannot trace the genesis of 
the American commitment to religious freedom without reckon-
ing the values and presuppositions of Williams.”4 
Hall’s effort is designed to expand First Amendment juris-
prudence beyond the “theoretically impoverished” reliance 
upon Thomas Jefferson and James Madison.5 He writes: 
To know what counts as a prohibited establishment of relig-
ion, one must have some sense of why establishments were 
prohibited in the first place. To know when the free exercise 
of religion has been abridged, one must ponder the reasons 
why religion was singled out for constitutional protection.6 
Hall argues that “Roger Williams’s writings . . . provide a 
framework of argument and theory more comprehensive than 
those set forth by any other writer either before or during the 
constitutional period.”7 Hall believes that Williams has some-
thing useful and important to contribute to our contemporary 
understanding of the Establishment Clause and the Free Exer-
cise Clause. As we search for a suitable Establishment Clause 
foundation, Hall recommends looking into the theoretical bases 
of Williams’s religious separatism.8 For the interpretation of 
the Free Exercise Clause, Hall proposes a new theoretical an-
chor: Williams’s concept of religious liberty as “freedom to be 
ruled by God.”9 Hall summarizes his effort by explaining that 
“[w]e . . . cannot pretend to give historical content to the relig-
ion clauses without taking seriously their origin, at least in 
part, in a believing parentage, and Williams is a key theoreti-
cian of this parentage.”10 
II.  MAKING ROGER WILLIAMS RELEVANT AS AN INTELLECTUAL 
SOURCE 
This is not the first time Williams’s name has come up in a 
contemporary legal setting. Beginning in 1940, Hall explains, 
 
 4. Id. at 3. 
 5. See id. at 5. 
 6. Id. at 5. 
 7. Id. at 5. 
 8. See id. at 11, 157. 
 9. Id. at 11. 
 10. Id. at 117 (emphasis added). 
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the United States Supreme Court began crafting Roger Wil-
liams into a sort of liberal constitutional icon.11 The kind of in-
tellectual scrutiny that one would expect, however, did not ac-
company the Court’s symbolic use of Williams. Different legal 
scholars responded to the Court’s use of Williams, particularly 
to what they saw as the Court’s attempt to pigeon-hole Wil-
liams into Jefferson’s “wall of separation” metaphor, but their 
representations suffered the same shortcoming—employing 
Williams as a “metaphor” or “mute symbol” instead of an actual 
intellectual resource.12 
By limiting Williams’s contribution to the symbolic, Hall 
argues, modern jurisprudence is missing out on crucial contex-
tual understanding in the field of religious liberty. Williams’s 
“unique voice . . . deserves a larger place in the current revival 
of interest in the original historical understanding of the First 
Amendment’s religion clauses.”13 Hall believes that one of the 
primary obstacles in making Williams’s thought relevant to 
lawyers today has been the “great gulf that separates Wil-
liams’s world from that of most contemporary thinkers.”14 
Hall’s work represents one of the first attempts to bridge that 
gulf and “make Williams’s arguments for religious liberty ac-
cessible to legal analysis.”15 
A.  Roger Williams and the Puritan Establishment 
Hall begins his effort to make Williams accessible by re-
viewing and clarifying the historical situation of Williams and 
the Massachusetts Bay Colony that banished him. The “godly 
minister”16 Williams arrived in Massachusetts in 1631 “among 
the leading edge of the migration that would deposit thousands 
 
 11. See id. at 1, 5 (citing Minersville School District v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594 
n.3 (1940), overruled by, West Va. State Bd. Of Educ. v. Barrett, 319 U.S. 624 (1943)). 
 12. Id. at 2-3 nn.7 & 10 (citing MARK DEWOLFE HOWE, THE GARDEN AND THE 
WILDERNESS: RELIGION AND GOVERNMENT IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 5-31 (1965); 
Robert Cover, The Supreme Court, 1982 Term—Forward: Nomos and Narrative, 97 
HARV. L. REV. 19 (1983)). 
 13. Id. at 3. 
 14. Id. at 9. 
 15. Id. at 6. 
 16. Id. at 17 (“John Winthrop, then governor of the colony, noted the arrival [of 
Roger Williams] in his journal, observing simply that a ship had deposited ‘Mr. Wil-
liams, a godly minister, with his wife.’ ” (citing 1 JOHN WINTHROP, THE HISTORY OF 
NEW ENGLAND FROM 1630 TO 1649 41-42 (James Savage ed., Arno Press 1972) (1825)). 
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of Puritans in New England over the next two decades.”17 Hall 
suggests that the almost thirty-year-old Williams, with his 
Cambridge education and chaplain’s experience in England, 
could have become a respected leader in the Puritan colonial 
establishment. The Puritan establishment offered Williams a 
minister’s position in the Boston church, but he turned the of-
fer down. Hall suggests that in that “terse rejection by a young 
man of the chance to preach to the forebears of Boston Brah-
mins,”18 we can find not only Williams’s separatism, but the 
Separatist roots of the separation of church and state. 
Hall explains, “A seventeenth-century Separatist believed 
not so much in the separation of church and state as in the 
separation of true believers and churches from their polluted 
and false look-a-likes.”19 Williams refused communion with the 
Boston church because he found the Boston church spiritually 
flawed; in his words, he “dared not officiate to an unseparated 
people.”20 In Williams’s reasoning, he was simply following the 
teachings of Paul. The apostle Paul had commanded the church 
of Christ to “come out from among them, and be ye separate, 
saith the Lord, and touch not the unclean thing; and I will re-
ceive you.”21 
Separatism was not unique to Williams. The Puritans as a 
whole received their name because they believed the Church of 
England, though Protestant, remained in tradition and practice 
tainted by the Catholic Church. Yet, Williams followed his Pu-
ritan Separatist impulses “to a further level.”22 Williams would 
not minister to the Massachusetts Puritans because they were, 
in short, not pure enough. Williams believed the Boston church 
was still coddling the unrighteous and accommodating the un-
holy.23 Massachusetts Puritans as a whole seemed unwilling to 
sever all ties with the Anglican church and to exclude unbe-
lievers from their church services. Hall explains how Williams 
“branded” this kind of “indiscriminate fellowship[] with false 
 
 17. Id. at 17. 
 18. Id. at 18. 
 19. Id. at 19. 
 20. Id. at 18 (citing Letter from Roger Williams to John Cotton, in 2 THE 
CORRESPONDENCE OF ROGER WILLIAMS 630 (Glen W. LaFantasie ed., 1988)). 
 21. 2 Corinthians 6:17-18; see also HALL, supra note 2, at 19. 
 22. HALL, supra note 2, at 20. 
 23. See id. at 31 (reviewing the many “possibilities” by which Williams believed 
one could “pollute oneself in unholy fellowships”). 
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churches and unbelievers an impermissible accommodation.”24 
It was not only the unholy fellowships of the Massachusetts 
Puritan church that bothered Williams. The more critical prong 
of Williams’s separatism concerned the Massachusetts alliance 
of church and state. Contrary to the practice of the Massachu-
setts Bay Colony establishment, Williams believed that the 
civil magistrate’s power extended only to the “bodies and goods, 
and outward state of men, etc.”25 In his teachings, Williams 
“deliberately excluded the spiritual affairs from civil superin-
tendence.”26 At the same time he denounced the Boston church 
for its unseparatism, Williams questioned the civil magistrate’s 
authority to punish Sabbath-breakers.27 For Williams, Hall ex-
plains, the matter was simple: “Government had no business 
superintending purely religious affairs.”28 
Williams conceived of civil and ecclesiastical authority in 
terms of the two “tables” of the Ten Commandments, as re-
corded in the Book of Exodus.29 The first table contained the 
“covenant community’s responsibilities toward God, and the 
second [concerned the] affairs of people with one another.”30 
The Puritan establishment believed that it was “the duty of the 
magistrate, to take care of matters of religion, . . . improv[ing] 
his civil authority for the observing of the duties commanded in 
the first, as well as for observing of duties commanded in the 
second table.”31 Williams argued that civil government had “au-
thority only to enforce the commands of the second table—
which contained ‘the law of nature, the law moral and civil’—
and had no legitimate power to enforce the obligations of the 
first.”32 In its attempts to enforce those obligations of the first 
“table” by combining ecclesiastical and civil jurisdiction, Wil-
liams believed the civil magistrate extended the “spiritual 
stain” of the unseparated Puritan church onto every resident of 
the colony willing or otherwise. It was this “persecution” that 
 
 24. Id. at 27. 
 25. Id. at 36. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See id. at 33. 
 28. Id. 
 29. See Exodus 20:1-11, 12-17; see also HALL, supra note 2, at 37 & n.106. 
 30. HALL, supra note 2, at 37. 
 31. Id. (quoting THE CAMBRIDGE PLATFORM (1648), reprinted in THE CREEDS AND 
PLATFORMS OF CONGREGATIONALISM (Williston Walker ed., Pilgrim Press 1960) (1892)). 
 32. Id. (quoting Roger Williams, The Bloudy Tenent, of Persecution, in 3 THE 
COMPLETE WRITINGS OF ROGER WILLIAMS 355, 358 (1963)). 
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became the subject of Williams’s principal work, The Bloudy 
Tenet, of Persecution.33 Williams believed: (1) the Massachu-
setts Puritan church defiled itself by its continued affiliation 
with the Anglican church and its fellowshipping of the unbe-
liever and (2) by its alliance with the state, this Puritan estab-
lishment persecuted its individual citizens with “soul or spiri-
tual rape.”34 This two-fold belief in separatism led Williams to 
his conclusions about disestablishment. 
B.  Banishment 
As one may imagine, Williams’s protests did not sit well 
with the Puritan establishment. Hall writes, “Neither civil nor 
ecclesiastical leaders in New England were inclined to sit idly 
by while their City upon a Hill went up in smoke.”35 The au-
thorities believed Williams’s teachings of separatism threat-
ened both the external political viability and the internal social 
stability of the Massachusetts Bay Colony. Remember, the year 
was 1634, and the Puritans retained their patent and colony 
charter at the pleasure of the king. Hall explains, “Massachu-
setts authorities had ample reason to believe that their politi-
cal future hinged on pledging at least the appearance of loyalty 
to the Church of England, and Williams’s Separatist rantings 
threatened the appearance of that loyalty.”36 A political future 
was not their only concern. The Puritans feared internal insta-
bility and the displeasure of God more than that of the king. By 
excluding spiritual matters from the civil magistrate’s jurisdic-
tion, Puritan leaders believed that Williams threatened to 
“open[] the door ‘unto a thousand profanities’ . . . [and] pre-
vent[] authorities from seeing that the land did not become 
‘such a sink of abominations, as would have been the reproach 
and ruin of Christianity in these parts of the world.’ ”37 The Pu-
ritans, it seems, believed their new world was a tinderbox 
ready to implode under the flame of religious liberty. Williams 
threatened to unravel the social tapestry that Massachusetts 
 
 33. Id. Hall uses the seven volume set The Complete Writings of Roger Williams 
(Russell and Russell, New York 1963) as the “primary source of Williams’s writings,” 
including the work The Bloudy Tenet, of Persecution. Id. at 11 n.1. 
 34. See HALL, supra note 3, at 86-87, 96 n.82. 
 35. Id. at 37. 
 36. Id. at 34. 
 37. Id. at 37 (quoting colonial commentator Cotton Mather in COTTON MATHER, 
MAGNALIA CHRISTI AMERICANA 430 (Arno Press 1972) (1702)). 
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Bay authorities wove together to contain their precarious socio-
political situation. 
After rejecting the Boston church ministry, Williams served 
for a time as the minister of the Salem church. But the natural 
progression of his separatism consumed him. Williams per-
sisted in contesting the ecclesiastical authority of the civil mag-
istrate. He also eventually renounced his own Salem church af-
ter the congregation there failed to oblige him in renouncing 
the other churches of the Bay Colony.38 Though the Puritan au-
thorities initially tolerated his rantings, they became increas-
ingly impatient with the ever more stubborn Williams.39 In 
September 1635, the colony’s General Court sentenced Wil-
liams to the “dry pit of banishment.”40 Rather than be shipped 
forcibly back to England, Hall explains, Williams fled to “the 
wilderness that became Rhode Island.”41 
Many today have criticized the banishment of Roger Wil-
liams by the Puritan establishment as an exercise in intoler-
ance. It is important to note, however, that neither side of the 
issue that developed around Williams’s presence in New Eng-
land was very “tolerant” in the modern sense of the word. It 
has been easy for commentators today to decry to the intoler-
ance of the Massachusetts Puritan establishment. Nobody  
today likes, for example, the idea of government authorities  
cutting the ears off a man for having uttered “scan-
dalous speeches” against the government and church of Sa-
lem.42 Most have not understood, however, the “relentless[] in-
toleran[ce]” of Roger Williams.43 Hall suggests that this misun-
derstanding is due to the fact that most theorists today 
 
 38. Hall describes this as Williams’s “one final display of Separatist zeal.” Id. at 
38. 
 39. Hall outlines the “four propositions advanced by Williams” that the Massa-
chusetts authorities interpreted as “jeopardizing the fragile social order” of the Bay 
Colony. Id. at 33. Those propositions were (1) Williams’s insistence on visible acts of 
separation from the Anglican church; (2) Williams’s objections to the legitimacy of the 
king’s asserted authority over the New World—he believed the “Natives [were] the true 
owners” of the land; (3) Williams’s objections to the colony’s “oath of loyalty” as a form 
of “government-sponsored mockery of God”; and (4) Williams’s defining the scope of 
civil authority so as to exclude spiritual matters. See id. at 33-37. 
 40. Id. at 38-39. 
 41. Id. at 39. 
 42. See id. at 48-49 (discussing the corporal punishment meted out to the Puritan 
dissenter Philip Ratcliff in 1631 and the “similar treatment” given to Quakers thirty 
years later). 
 43. Id. at 27. 
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approach Williams’s situation under the belief that “[r]eligious 
dogmatism . . . [is] incompatible with liberal democratic dis-
course.”44 Without realizing the actual compatibility of the two 
concepts, many wonder how such a fervent advocate of civil tol-
eration in religious matters could, by refusing the offer to min-
ister in the Boston church and objecting to any form of religious 
pluralism, express such an “unlamblike frame,” an “unmove-
able stiffness,” and “headiness” in his dogmatic separatism.45 
Hall forces us to understand America’s religious dogmatism, 
and he contrasts Williams’s harsh separatist attitude with the 
softer ecumenical approach so often expressed by the Supreme 
Court today.46 
Hall suggests that Williams well represented the mindset of 
the early Americans; he was, in short, “a paragon of obstinacy 
in an obstinate century.”47 Many today assume that the origins 
of the First Amendment lie in a sort of official toleration or 
ecumenism of times past. Tolerance was really a non-issue in 
the origin of religious liberty thought, however. By portraying 
Williams as the unabashed religious fanatic, Hall suggests, 
quite differently, that the First Amendment roots are to be 
found in the headiness of a religious dogmatist expressing a de-
cidable intolerance. Hall’s characterization of First Amendment 
beginnings can help us understand why so many remain unsat-
isfied with many jurists’ failure to distinguish between the tol-
erance the First Amendment mandates and the religious intol-
erance the First Amendment was designed to protect. Williams 
understood that one person’s tolerance was another’s intoler-
ance. In Williams’s world both sides showed themselves intol-
erant, and Williams did not object to intolerance in principle. 
Williams merely protested the state-sanctioned intolerance of 
the Massachusetts colony; that position eventually led the es-
tablished Puritans to banish Williams from their presence. 
Over the course of four decades following his banishment, 
Williams and his followers founded and developed the Provi-
dence Colony that eventually became Rhode Island. The set-
tlers established there a compactual civil government with 
powers limited “only [to] civil things,” and crafted a “remark-
 
 44. Id. at 161. 
 45. Id. at 18. 
 46. See id. at 162-63 (contrasting Williams’s separatism with Justice Scalia’s 
ecumenical “intolerant tolerance” expressed most frequently in school prayer cases). 
 47. Id. at 18. 
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able” system of disestablishment with regard to church state 
matters.48 The principle focus of Hall’s book during this period 
of time is not the Rhode Island colonial experiment, however. 
Most legal scholars of Williams’s day dismissed Rhode Island’s 
“poly-piety,” and even Williams himself noted the great amount 
of disorder suffered by his colony.49 Colonial Americans be-
lieved Rhode Island’s experiment with religious liberty was a 
dismal failure, the “latrine of New England.”50 
Hall concentrates his analysis, rather, on Williams’s efforts 
during his time in Rhode Island to expose the “persecution” of 
the New England Puritans. Almost immediately upon his arri-
val in Rhode Island, it seems, and continuing for the next forty 
years, Williams assaulted the persecution of the New England 
Puritan establishment with a “stream of letters and books.”51 
Hall explains that these writings “were more than a mere 
stream of ad hominem arguments” against the Massachusetts 
authorities.52 Williams rose above the emotional level of the 
struggle and dissected the Puritan persecution at the intellec-
tual level. “Williams located the root of persecution in bad 
thinking.”53 Hall spends two chapters outlining the particulars 
of the debate between Williams and the Puritan establishment. 
C.  The Intellectual Syllogisms of Religious Persecution and 
Religious Liberty 
The New England Puritans regularly exercised civil power 
to punish religious dissenters. There is a tendency to believe 
that these public condemnations were the result of irrational 
primitive fear and animosity. However, Hall bares three social 
“premises and deductions” of the Puritan institution to demon-
strate how religious persecution thrived in the “cool light of 
reason.”54 Roger Williams attacked these intellectual bases of 
the Puritans’ religious persecution. 
First, the Puritans believed the Bible, and they saw them-
selves as literal heirs of the biblical tradition. They analogized 
their situation to that of the nation of Israel in the Old Testa-
 
 48. Id. at 100. 
 49. See id. at 100-03. 
 50. Id. at 116, 136 n.2. 
 51. Id. at 72. 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. at 48-49. 
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ment. As a result, they looked to the Bible as a source of law, 
literally, and saw heresy in any form of government that was 
not a theocracy. Puritan magistrates, according to leading colo-
nist John Winthrop, were to dispense justice “by the rules of 
God’s laws and our own.”55 Their belief about the direct rele-
vance of Old Testament text and its natural applicability to all 
God’s children formed the first premise of their social logic. 
The second premise concerns the Puritan vision of liberty. 
Liberty to the Puritans was liberty to establish a “New Zion” 
for holy commonwealth.56 Because they held this responsibility 
in such high esteem, the only freedom they guaranteed reli-
gious dissenters was, in Nathaniel Ward’s words, “freedom ‘to 
keep away from us.’ ”57 They envisioned their power to punish 
religious transgressors as a power arising out of the social con-
tract. Hall explains, “the ideas of contract and consent . . . 
formed a second critical premise of [Puritan] establishment 
logic.”58 
Because the Puritans saw their spiritual efforts as a com-
munity effort, it was not difficult to form the third premise of 
their establishment syllogism: that spiritual error has public 
consequences. Hall explains, “Puritans likened those who 
propagated erroneous religious views [and evildoers] not only 
to a contagion but also to thieves and murderers who stole the 
purity of true believers and seduced them to follow the way of 
spiritual death.”59 Colony authorities, therefore, “made it their 
business to secure civil peace by securing ecclesiastical peace, . 
. . and in this business they were largely successful.”60 
In his writings, Roger Williams challenged the three prem-
ises of the Puritan’s social logic. Williams argued: (1) that the 
Old Testament was a relevant legal text only at a sufficiently 
abstract level;61 (2) that the religious covenant with God was 
prior to the social contract and, therefore, “God had not in-
vested the people of any civil state with power to rule the 
 
 55. Id. at 54 (quoting 2 WINTHROP, supra note 16, at 238). 
 56. Id. at 56. 
 57. Id. at 55-56 (quoting NATHANIEL WARD, THE SIMPLE COBLER OF AGGAWAN IN 
AMERICA (P.M. Zall ed., Univ. of Neb. Press 1969)). 
 58. Id. at 56. Many note the irony that a religious people fleeing the institutional-
ized religious persecution of the Anglican church would turn around and institute that 
very same form of persecution in their own society. 
 59. Id. at 59. 
 60. Id. 
 61. See id. at 73-77. 
MUM-FIN.DOC 4/10/00  1:18 PM 
957] BOOK REVIEW: ROGER WILLIAMS 967 
church or keep it pure”;62 and (3) that because “the citizen and 
the magistrate need not profess and practice true religion to 
fulfill their roles,” the “agitation occasioned by religious contro-
versy did not threaten the peace of the civil state.”63 Nowhere 
in Williams’s writings will the legal scholar find the kind of 
secularism so prevalent in discussions about religious liberty 
today. “To whatever radicalism he ultimately inclined,” writes 
Hall, “Williams nevertheless remained steadfastly within the 
world of faith. . . .”64 And according to Hall, Williams’s re-
sponses to the Puritan persecution logic eventually formed the 
theoretical foundation of the First Amendment.65 
III.  ROGER WILLIAMS AND THE CONSTITUTION 
A.  Roger Williams as a Constitutional Resource 
Plainly, Hall believes that Roger Williams should have an 
important role in constitutional discourse today. In his book, 
however, he does not attempt to make a direct “genealogical” 
link between Williams’s thought and the constitutional found-
ing. Hall notes that Williams’s thought had begun to make a 
resurgence around the 1770s but writes, “Even then, influen-
tial theorists such as Locke, Madison, and Jefferson proceeded 
without apparent influence from Williams’s ideas.”66 Efforts to 
demonstrate any sort of “tutelage” from Williams to Madison, 
Hall admits, are “far from persuasive.”67 Nevertheless, Hall as-
serts that Williams remains significant to contemporary dis-
cussions concerning religious liberty because he “exemplifies a 
voice within [the history of the First Amendment] often 
drowned out by the Enlightenment resonance of Jefferson and 
Madison.”68 
 
 62. Id. at 78. 
 63. Id. at 79-81. 
 64. Id. at 147. 
 65. See id. at 3, 116-18 (noting that “[a]ttempts to demonstrate that constitu-
tional architects such as James Madison received tutelage . . . from Williams are far 
from persuasive,” id. at 3, but arguing that because Williams “stands at the beginning,” 
id., of the American legal tradition of religious liberty and because he “exemplifies a 
voice within [First Amendment] history,” id. at 117, “the significance of Roger Williams 
does not hinge on any precise genealogical line between his ideas and the constitutional 
text,” id. at 3). 
 66. Id. at 117. 
 67. Id. at 3. 
 68. Id. at 117. 
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B. Comparing Roger Williams to Locke, Jefferson, and Madison 
Hall spends an entire chapter of Separating Church and 
State comparing the content of Williams’s thought with the 
“humanistic rationalism” of Locke, Jefferson, and Madison. He 
uses Williams as a “counterpoint” to demonstrate how our First 
Amendment jurisprudence should reflect its origins in “evan-
gelical passion.”69 He begins his analytic comparison with 
Locke. 
1.  Roger Williams and John Locke 
The fundamentals of John Locke’s writings, according to 
Hall, are “strikingly similar to those of the Rhode Island fire-
brand.”70 Hall points out that both Locke and Williams “at-
tempted to defend religious liberty by circumscribing the scope 
of civil government.”71 Locke’s writings, however, had a much 
greater impact on Puritan intolerance than the writings of Wil-
liams. Hall explains that it was only after Williams died that 
the Puritans began moderating their intolerance—a develop-
ment that came about primarily in response to pressure from 
England and the proponents of the Toleration Act of 1689, for 
which Locke was the “intellectual father.”72 Locke’s Letter Con-
cerning Toleration likewise became a major influence on consti-
tutional thinking in early America. 
Locke and Williams were limited in what they agreed upon, 
however; their views diverged especially with regard to the 
scope of religious liberty. These differences seem to indicate a 
certain incompleteness about Williams’s religious liberty. Hall 
explains, “Williams never faced quite squarely the question of 
whether religious belief was subject to what now would be 
termed the neutral laws of general applicability.”73 Locke ad-
dressed this question, but his answer seems equally unsatisfy-
ing and unavailing: Locke resolved all conflicts between reli-
gious conscience and general law in favor of government 
authority. Hall observes, “Locke failed to acknowledge suffi-
ciently the extent to which notions of ‘public peace’ and ‘harm 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. at 118. 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. at 116. 
 73. Id. at 119. 
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to others’ could be manipulated to limit religious freedom.”74 
The problem with Locke’s “the state wins” rule, according to 
Hall, is that it achieves its protection of religion only by mar-
ginalizing religion.75 Hall concludes, “Locke’s principal argu-
ment for religious liberty . . . yields a stunted concept of that 
liberty. His argument concerning the ineffectiveness of perse-
cution never forcefully replicates Roger Williams’s metaphor of 
persecution as rape.”76 Williams, Hall argues, was much more 
sensitive to the possibility of a government-sponsored-
secularist policy burdening religious conscience. 
2.  Roger Williams and Thomas Jefferson 
Thomas Jefferson has been a (if not “the”) major source of 
reference for Supreme Court religious liberty jurisprudence. 
Williams and Jefferson share many of the beliefs reflected in 
Jefferson’s contributions to the Virginia Bill for Establishing 
Religious Freedom and in his famous Danbury Baptist letter. 
In contrast with Locke’s rule, Williams and Jefferson both ex-
tended religious liberty to atheists and Catholics. Jefferson and 
Williams also both agreed that state support threatened to cor-
rupt religion. But Hall argues that because Jefferson’s writings 
were only “occasional,” his theory was ultimately unarticulated 
and incomplete. 
Williams developed an elaborate theory around his separa-
tism and religious dogmatism, whereas Jefferson relied primar-
ily on only one justification for religious liberty: that the 
“[m]ind ‘cannot be restrained,’ and attempts to do so ‘tend only 
to begat habits of hypocrisy and meanness.’ ”77 Hall argues that 
Jefferson’s Virginia Bill contained little more than a “freedom 
not to be required to worship.”78 He writes, “[T]o say that gov-
ernment may not coerce beliefs is to say very little.”79 Williams, 
in contrast, conceived of a religious liberty that included not 
only the freedom to believe but the freedom to exercise that be-
lief. Hall concludes, “[Jefferson’s] views concerning religious 
liberty were remarkably hospitable to his own brand of reli-
 
 74. Id. at 120-21. 
 75. See id. at 122. 
 76. Id. at 124. 
 77. Id. at 125. 
 78. Id. at 126. 
 79. Id. at 128. 
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gious experience and far less protective of the religious experi-
ences of others.”80 Jefferson’s religious experience was an intel-
lectual affair, far removed from acts and conduct. Williams, ac-
cording to Hall, “demonstrated a far greater sensitivity than 
Jefferson to consciences that differed from his own.”81 In short, 
Jefferson expounded a doctrine for religious liberty that re-
flected what Hall calls a “freedom from religion.”82 Williams, on 
the other hand, constructed a religious liberty that included 
more of a “freedom for religion—what Hall calls an individual’s 
“freedom to obey God.”83 
3.  Roger Williams and James Madison 
Roger Williams and James Madison share many more fun-
damental beliefs about religious liberty than Williams and Jef-
ferson or Locke. Madison, for example, advocated the same sort 
of freedom “to embrace, to profess and to observe” religion that 
Williams did.84 And Madison envisioned the same kind of 
heightened scrutiny review as Williams: that religious liberty 
would be limited only “by certain specified government inter-
ests.”85 Like Williams, Madison founded religious liberty in the 
belief that religious obligations arise prior to the social con-
tract. Madison believed that religious freedom arose out of the 
recognition that man owed God prior and weightier obligations 
than he owed the state.86 
Though their personal faiths differed immensely (Hall de-
scribes their differences as coming from “opposite poles of reli-
gious understanding”), Williams and Madison developed “a 
concept of religious toleration of uncanny resemblance.”87 Hall 
writes, “Each could imagine a society in which religious disor-
der did not inevitably destroy public order. Each saw the world 
under the dominion of competing sovereigns and sought to 
 
 80. Id. at 131. 
 81. Id. at 132. 
 82. Id. at 130. 
 83. Id. at 129-30. 
 84. Id. at 135 (citing James Madison’s A Memorial and Remonstrance, written to 
Virginia’s General Assembly to protest the establishment scheme of “A Bill establish-
ing a provision for Teachers of the Christian Religion” that was proposed and ulti-
mately defeated during the later part of the 1780s) 
 85. Id. 
 86. See id. at 134. 
 87. Id. at 136. 
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fashion bounds by which individuals would not be called upon 
to betray either.”88 Hall argues that Williams and Madison, in 
contrast to Locke, Jefferson, and the secularist approach of the 
Supreme Court today, “took religion seriously, seriously enough 
to deem it worthy of the most vigilant protection.”89 
C.  Roger Williams’s View and Approach 
Though Hall never specifically says so, Roger Williams 
would take a decidedly nonpreferential approach to religion 
clause jurisprudence today. This conclusion will disappoint 
many who would have hoped otherwise. Nonpreferentialism is 
the minority, but persistent, view in modern religion clause ju-
risprudence that the First Amendment requires impartiality as 
between particular religions and sects but not as between relig-
ion and irreligion.90 The majority view of the Supreme Court, in 
contrast, as reflected in opinions as early as Everson v. Board 
of Education,91 requires strict governmental neutrality.92 To 
meet the standard of constitutionality under Everson, a gov-
ernment action must be secular in purpose and secular in pri-
mary impact.93 Everson requires the government to be abso-
lutely neutral—in other words, “not just among Protestant 
 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. See Rosenberger v. Rector, 515 U.S. 819, 855 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting); 
Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); see also George F. 
Will, Editorial, June 5, 1985, excerpted in Eastland, infra note 93, at 368-69 (criticizing 
the Court’s Everson and Wallace v. Jaffree line of decisions—those reasoning that “the 
Establishment Clause requires government to be punctiliously neutral, not between 
religious sects but between religion and secularism”—as “contrary to the clear evidence 
of the Framers’ intentions,” and suggesting “Will’s Generic Opinion [that t]he practice 
in question does not do what the Establishment Clause was intended to prevent—
impose an official creed, or significantly enhance or hinder a sect—so the practice is 
constitutional and the complaining parties should buzz off”). 
 91. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). 
 92. This view has been described by Gerald Gunther and Kathleen Sullivan as 
one of “voluntarism and separatism.” See, e.g., GERALD GUNTHER & KATHLEEN M. 
SULLIVAN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 1463 (13th ed. 1997) (quoting Larry Tribe, Gunther 
and Sullivan explain, “[Voluntarism means] that the advancement of a church would 
come only from the voluntary support of its followers and not from the political support 
of the state. [Separatism means] that both religion and government function best if 
each remains independent of the other”). 
 93. See Terry Eastland, Introduction, in RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN THE SUPREME 
COURT 2-3 (Terry Eastland ed., 1993) (describing the 1947 Everson decision and the 
three-part Lemon test that the Supreme Court developed later pursuant to Everson, 
but acknowledging that the “ ‘Lemon test’ has not always been applied in establish-
ment cases”). 
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churches . . . or among all religious groups, but also between re-
ligious believers and non-believers.”94 
Nonpreferentialism, best articulated by Justice Rehnquist’s 
dissent in Wallace v. Jaffree, requires the Supreme Court to in-
terpret the First Amendment as “designed to prohibit the es-
tablishment of a national religion, and perhaps to prevent dis-
crimination among sects,” but not “as requiring neutrality on 
the part of government between religion and irreligion.”95 A 
nonpreferentialist interpretation of the religion clauses would 
permit Congress or a state to “pursu[e] legitimate secular ends 
through nondiscriminatory sectarian means.”96 
One may question the usefulness of Williams’s nonpreferen-
tialism today. Williams would object to any sort of nonpreferen-
tialism that threatened to “stain” citizens, for example, but his 
conception of “stain” depended primarily on his own feelings 
about the particular practice of that religion in question.97 Hall 
points out, however, that Williams “would have permitted the 
civil magistrate to encourage true religion. . . . He often de-
clared that the civil magistrate ought to ‘countenance’ and ‘en-
courage’ the church . . . , to protect believers from would-be 
persecutors and permit them to exercise their religions 
freely.”98 Williams was especially concerned about forcing reli-
gious minorities to remove themselves from “the republican 
discourse concerning the common good.”99 It is precisely be-
cause of this kind of concern and complexity that Hall proposes 
a reintroduction of Williams as an intellectual resource for our 
legal discourse today. True democratic processes require the 
participation of everyone in the community. 
 
 94. Eastland, supra note 93, at 3 (citing Justice Black’s opinion in Everson in 
which he wrote, “Neither a state nor the Federal Government . . . can pass laws which 
aid . . . all religions”). 
 95. Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 98 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (coming 
to this conclusion in establishment clause jurisprudence after reviewing Madison’s 
thinking “reflected by actions on the floor of the House in 1789” and contrasting his 
views with “the Court’s opinion in Everson”). But see Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 
612 (Souter, J., concurring) (“While a case has been made for [the nonpreferential] po-
sition, . . . I find in the history of the [Establishment] Clause’s textual development a 
more powerful argument supporting the Court’s jurisprudence following Everson.”) 
 96. Wallace, 472 U.S. at 113 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). 
 97. See HALL, supra note 2, at 105, 156-58 (reviewing Williams’s theory of “reli-
gious pretenses” which expresses an overly confident “ ‘I know it when I see it’ attitude” 
and reviewing Williams’s concept of “spiritual stain”). 
 98. Id. at 91 
 99. Id. at 158. 
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IV.  THE IMPACT OF ROGER WILLIAMS ON JURISPRUDENCE TODAY 
While Roger Williams may be a nonpreferentialist, he is 
unlikely to satisfy completely either side of any particular 
question in religious clause jurisprudence today. Hall appears 
to endorse an originalist interpretative approach for our mod-
ern religion clause jurisprudence,100 but he distances himself 
somewhat from the particulars of the contemporary debate.101 
Hall is merely concerned, he reassures his readers, with “situ-
ating [Williams’s] arguments within the broad currents of con-
stitutional tradition relating to the religion clauses.”102 In this 
“larger debate about religious freedom and religious establish-
ment,” Hall concludes, “Roger Williams deserves a renewed in-
vitation.”103 
Williams’s contributions will likely enrich the debate but 
will not necessarily resolve it. Hall writes, “[Williams] alienates 
Jeffersonian skeptics by the fervency of his faith and believers 
by the secularism of his political vision.”104 It was precisely this 
kind of complexity, Hall acknowledges, that made early Ameri-
cans forget about Williams in the first place.105 Nevertheless, 
Hall expects that the legal scholar will find his Williams-
revitalization effort long overdue. Situated between the debate 
of skeptics and believers, Williams may just provide the recon-
ciliatory catalyst that our religion clause jurisprudence has 
been missing. 
 
 100. But see id. at 5 (allowing a legal thinker to use Williams “whether one is an 
originalist and believes that the Constitution should be construed to reflect the intent 
of its Framers or whether one seeks to infuse the words of the First Amendment with 
some concept of religious liberty not necessarily coextensive with the Framers’ intent”). 
Perhaps Hall’s assumption reflects the development, acknowledged by Michael Perry, 
that in constitutional theory “we are all originalists now.” Michael J. Perry, The Le-
gitimacy of Particular Conceptions of Constitutional Interpretation, 77 VA. L. REV. 669, 
718 (1991) (noting that “we (constitutional theorists, judges, [and] lawyers, etc.) . . . are 
all originalists now—or should be,” but arguing that “originalists must be nonoriginal-
ists” and that the “originalism/nonoriginalism debate is now largely spent”). 
 101. See HALL, supra note 2, at 7-8 (discussing some of the particular issues in the 
Supreme Court’s “ongoing deliberation concerning religious liberty,” but emphasizing 
that he is merely “situating [Williams’s] arguments within the broad currents of consti-
tutional tradition relating to the religion clauses”). 
 102. Id. at 7. 
 103. Id. at 8. 
 104. Id. at 166. 
 105. See id. at 116 (“[D]eath finally quenched Roger Williams’s insatiable thirst 
for debate. New England found itself free at last from the sound of his polemic and, in 
honor of the event, promptly forgot him.”). 
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Hall describes the development of today’s debate between 
skeptics and believers: 
[T]he First Amendment religion clauses had their origins in 
conflicting traditions: the one variously described as Enlight-
enment or humanistic rationalism, the other as evangelical or 
Protestant dissent. . . . Subsequently, however, a theoretical 
posture derived principally from Jefferson, the archetypal 
American representative of Enlightenment thought, came to 
dominate First Amendment jurisprudence.106 
Skeptical Enlightenment thought came to dominate religion 
clause jurisprudence even though it shares the history of the 
First Amendment with evangelical dissent.107 That dominance 
began in Reynolds v. United States when the Supreme Court 
relied upon Jefferson’s letter to the Danbury Baptist—in which 
Jefferson set forth the metaphor of the “wall of separation” to 
describe the First Amendment religion clause—as “an authori-
tative declaration of the scope and effect” of the First Amend-
ment’s religion clauses.108 Hall questions and discredits the Su-
preme Court’s “authoritative” reliance upon Jefferson’s wall of 
separation metaphor. He argues, “Th[e] Jeffersonian domi-
nance of First Amendment theory is historically untenable . . . 
[because] the first amendment owes more to evangelical pas-
sions than to Enlightenment skepticism.”109 Hall concludes 
Separating Church and State by providing an indication of how 
he expects a return to the thought of evangelical passion and 
dissent, as expressed by Williams, will affect our modern inter-
pretation of both the Establishment and the Free Exercise 
Clauses. 
A.  Roger Williams and the Establishment Clause 
Hall is not certain how Williams would resolve issues such 
as civic prayer and other public religious displays that the in-
 
 106. Id. at 117. 
 107. See id. 
 108. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878); see also HALL, supra note 
2, at 116-17. 
 109. HALL, supra note 2, at 117; see also id. (quoting the observation of William 
Lee Miller, in The First Liberty: Religion and the American Republic, that “dissenting 
Protestantism ‘had more to do, over all, over time, pound for pound, head for head, with 
the shaping of the American tradition of religious liberty than did the rational argu-
ment”). 
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terpretation of the Establishment Clause faces today.110 He ex-
pects Williams’s approach would certainly be refreshing, how-
ever. Williams’s separatism would lead him to caution against 
government-sponsored religious exercises, but for different rea-
sons than the secularist Supreme Court. The Court in Engel v. 
Vitale struck down a school prayer statute reasoning that 
“[w]hen the power, prestige and financial support of govern-
ment is placed behind a particular religious belief, the indirect 
coercive pressure upon religious minorities to conform to the 
prevailing officially approved religion is plain.”111 Williams, on 
the other hand, would proscribe harm inflicted by such an ex-
ercise because it would both “force religious minorities to sever 
civil communion to avoid spiritual pollution” and “wound the 
civil community by compelling the severance of religious mi-
norities and thus fracturing the community.”112 Hall favors Wil-
liams’s approach because it would move the civic prayer juris-
prudence away from the Supreme Court’s casting of religious 
dissenters and nonbelievers “into [the] unflattering role of 
weakness, as though the establishment clause were a neces-
sary guardian for timid souls.”113 
Hall worries that by our modern secularism, we have 
moved toward an official ecumenism that strips religion of its 
fervency and meaning and strips liberal democracy of a critical 
ally. Separatist toleration, writes Hall, can be distinguished 
from ecumenical toleration, like that advocated primarily by 
Justice Scalia, in two respects: (1) Separatist toleration is “pre-
occupied” with our differences rather than any similarities be-
tween our religious traditions, and (2) “[s]eparatist tolera-
tion . . . engender[s] . . . simply civil cooperation.”114 Separatist 
toleration, therefore, tolerates religious intolerance. By tolerat-
ing intolerance, we move toward democratic reconciliation. The 
importance of this separatism cannot be overstated; Hall sug-
gests we take a lesson from our history. “Separatists have fre-
 
 110. See id. at 6 (summing up current debate over the First Amendment including 
the question, “Second, does a nation need a common religious foundation and should 
government be able to foster such commonality?”). Note that Williams did not address 
an issue that has arisen due to our “modern welfare state”: “[T]o what extent should 
concerns for keeping religion and government separate disqualify religious believers 
and religious institutions from receiving benefits made generally available . . . ?” Id. 
 111. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 431 (1962). 
 112. HALL, supra note 2, at 158. 
 113. Id. at 157. 
 114. Id. at 160. 
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quently been on what we would now designate the side of the 
angels in important disputes, and the more ecumenically spir-
ited have championed causes that now smack of intolerance.”115 
It was the ecumenics, Hall reminds us, who opposed Jefferson’s 
Bill for Establishing Religious Freedom. The separatists, 
chiefly Baptists, aligned themselves with Jefferson and Madi-
son to defeat the Bill Establishing a Provision for Teachers of 
Christian Religion and enact Jefferson’s bill in its stead.116 
Hall argues that the American tradition of religious liberty 
“is animated principally by a concern to preserve rather than 
subdue religious difference.”117 Were this separatist toleration 
to be implemented in modern Establishment Clause jurispru-
dence, rulings of constitutionality would no longer depend on a 
law’s ecumenism or pristine secularism.118 Perhaps Williams’s 
greatest contribution to United States Supreme Court juris-
prudence would be to show that “dogmatism alone does not 
threaten democracy.”119 
B.  Roger Williams and the Free Exercise Clause 
Roger Williams developed a free exercise doctrine that in-
cluded the right to believe and exercise. But even then, he real-
ized “that the religious conscience was not [completely] exempt 
from the commands of the law.”120 Hall sums up the free exer-
cise debate today with the following question: “[U]nder what 
circumstances should believers be granted exemptions from 
laws serving legitimate public purposes and not aimed at the 
suppression of religion when those laws conflict with the claims 
of religious conscience?”121 Hall notes that Williams “never 
faced squarely the question of whether religious belief was sub-
ject to what now would be termed the neutral laws of general 
applicability.”122 In his writings and in the Rhode Island ex-
 
 115. Id. at 161. 
 116. See id. 
 117. Id. at 164. 
 118. See, e.g., Will, supra note 90, at 368-69 (criticizing the Supreme Court’s ap-
proach in Wallace v. Jaffree in which “Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, took 
twenty-three pages to explain that Alabama’s purpose was not pristinely secular and 
hence the law violates the convoluted misconstruction with which the Court had re-
placed the unambiguous concision of the Framers’ Establishment Clause”). 
 119. HALL, supra note 2, at 162. 
 120. See id. 
 121. Id. at 6. 
 122. Id. at 119. 
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periment, however, Williams did contemplate the limits of reli-
gious liberty. 
The religious conscience was not exempt from the com-
mands of law under Williams’s religious liberty. He developed a 
concept of “religious pretenses” or “unadorned meanness mas-
querading as religious sensibility” to prevent uncivil behavior 
rationalized under the auspices of religious conscience.123 Wil-
liams doubted, according to Hall, “whether acts of incivility 
could ever be authentically religious.”124 Hall notes that “Wil-
liams’s willingness to subject ‘religious pretenses’ to the gen-
eral requirements of civil law may have betrayed an overly con-
fident ‘I know it when I see it’ attitude toward authentic 
religion.”125 Williams’s primary contribution to this area, how-
ever, was the recognition that “both conscience and government 
ha[ve] limits.”126 
The limits of government included the protection of reli-
gious conduct and exercise. In contrast to the Supreme Court’s 
contemporary Free Exercise doctrine, Roger Williams would 
not “subject[] the claims of conscience to any generally applica-
ble law so long as it does not deliberately infringe upon reli-
gious belief or act.”127 In Williams’s view, “Liberty of conscience 
protected the individual from the dilemma of having to choose 
between sovereigns [i.e., God and Caesar] . . . .”128 In his writ-
ings, Williams developed the concept of “compelled from” wor-
ship to compliment the concept of coerced or compelled worship 
that Jefferson was so concerned about.129 Williams turned reli-
gious liberty, in short, into a “freedom for religion,” instead of 
the Jeffersonian emphasis on “freedom from religion.”130 Wil-
liams’s theory perhaps best exemplifies the special place relig-
ion occupies in the Constitution with his conception of religious 
 
 123. Id. at 105. Williams would probably question and reject Justice Black’s defi-
nition of religious liberty granting free exercise protection even to those holding “essen-
tially political, sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal moral code.” See 
Welsh v. United States, 398 U.S. 333 (1970) (finding a valid conscientious objector ex-
emption even though the Vietnam era draft law excluded beliefs based on “political, 
sociological, or philosophical views or a merely personal code” from protection). 
 124. HALL, supra note 2, at 105. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 109. 
 127. Id.; cf. Employment Div., Dep’t of Human Resources v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 
(1990). 
 128. HALL, supra note 2, at 149. 
 129. See id. at 108. 
 130. Id. at 130. 
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liberty as “the right of the individual to respond to the divine 
command.”131 Because he envisioned the divine covenant as an 
obligation prior to the social contract, Williams gives us a First 
Amendment concerned with the “freedom to obey God.”132 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Abraham Lincoln once noted that a Supreme Court decision 
is never a “thus saith the Lord.”133 Lincoln believed that Ameri-
cans, including devout Americans, should work to change Su-
preme Court rulings they may disagree with. The experience of 
Roger Williams reinforces Lincoln’s candor in constitutional 
beginnings. In contrast to that shared democratic vision, how-
ever, the Supreme Court’s shift to secularism has effectively 
excluded the “intellectual vocabularies” of religion from modern 
jurisprudence.134 With this book, Hall proposes we reintroduce 
the language of that “fundamental vision of life [that] can only 
be communicated within religious terms” back into the reli-
gious liberty discourse and constitutional jurisprudence.135 Wil-
liams can help in this effort, Hall suggests, because he used 
“that particular vocabulary” of “believers” to champion reli-
gious liberty.136 
Our Constitution contemplates a participatory society. Hall 
writes, “The parchment existence of the First Amendment’s re-
ligion clauses does not guarantee the security of religious free-
dom . . . [A] political consensus . . . requires a formative politi-
cal discourse.”137 In the past century, secularist skeptics have 
dominated First Amendment religion clause jurisprudence. Re-
ligious Americans have become understandably frustrated that 
 
 131. Id. at 149. 
 132. Id. at 129. 
 133. Eastland, supra note 93, at vii. 
 134. HALL, supra note 2, at 147; see also Dent, supra note 1, at 56 (“[S]ecularist 
justices [have] sought to banish religion from public life and exile it to the private 
sphere . . . . Because most moral principles widely-held in America stem from religion, 
however, there is no clear, objective basis for distinguishing secular from religious pur-
poses.”); Frederick Mark Gedicks, Religion, in THE OXFORD COMPANION TO THE 
SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES 717 (Kermit L. Hall ed., 1992) (“The constitu-
tional doctrines developed by the Court under the free exercise and establishment 
clauses can best be understood . . . within the context of a secular public culture that 
considers religion a predominantly private activity of no unique social significance.”). 
 135. HALL, supra note 2, at 147-49. 
 136. Id. at 149. 
 137. Id. at 148. 
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the “kind of bilingualism” that was once shared by the framers 
of the First Amendment had become “increasingly rare.”138 
Without a common baseline rooted in a “believing parentage,” 
the majority of Americans has been backed into an unflattering 
position of weakness.139 At a time in which some commentators 
are even questioning the probability of a religion clause theory 
at all, we need a reconversion to religious liberty, for skeptics 
and believers alike. As Hall suggests, Roger Williams, the 
“apostle of religious freedom to the religiously devout,” and the 
insubordinate radical who for over forty years kicked against 
the pricks of the Puritan Establishment, might just be the reli-
gious and constitutional zealot we are looking for.140 
Marcus Mumford** 
 
 138. Id. at 149. 
 139. See Dent, supra note 1, at 55 (“The Court believe[s] religious people are irra-
tional, try to suppress the truth, and need to be enlightened with secular truth.”). 
 140. HALL, supra note 2, at 147, 149. 
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